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WHERE DO WE GO FROM HERE? THE FUTURE
OF CAPS ON NONECONOMIC MEDICAL
MALPRACTICE DAMAGES IN GEORGIA
Laurin Elizabeth Nutt*
INTRODUCTION
“We have taken a step back. Our rates will be more expensive and
less accessible.”1 These were the words of Chairman of the Georgia
Senate Judiciary Committee, Preston Smith, on the day a unanimous
Georgia Supreme Court struck down Georgia Code section 51-13-1,
finding it unconstitutional.2 The statute limited noneconomic
damages, including physical and emotional pain, in medical
malpractice lawsuits to $350,000.3 The decision leaves Georgia
susceptible to the risks associated with allowing unlimited
noneconomic damage awards such as a decrease in the availability of
physicians, especially for the poor and people living in rural areas,
and delayed or denied health care.4 In Atlanta Oculoplastic Surgery,
*
J.D. Candidate, 2012, Georgia State University College of Law. Thanks to Dean Kelly Timmons and
the Law Review editors for their valuable insight and suggestions.
1. Bill Rankin, State High Court Overturns State’s Tort Reform, ATLANTA J.-CONST., Mar. 23,
2010, at A1.
2. See id. (stating medical malpractice liability insurance rates will go up because the court struck
down the noneconomic damages cap statute for violating Georgia’s constitutional right to a jury trial for
medical malpractice claims).
3. GA. CODE ANN. § 51-13-1 (2005), declared unconstitutional by Atlanta Oculoplastic Surgery,
P.C. v. Nestlehutt, 691 S.E.2d 218 (Ga. 2010). The Georgia Supreme Court found Georgia Code section
51-13-1 unconstitutional in violation of the right to trial by jury set out in Georgia’s constitution because
it takes away the jury’s ability to assign damages. Atlanta Oculoplastic Surgery, P.C. v. Nestlehutt, 691
S.E.2d 218, 223 (Ga. 2010). The figure of $350,000 was set after a study of the Maryland General
Assembly found many non-frivolous, non-economic damage recoveries do not surpass this amount.
Murphy v. Edmonds, 601 A.2d 102, 115–16 (Md. 1992).
4. See, e.g., Alyson M. Palmer, Court Kills Caps on Med-Mal Awards, FULTON CNTY. DAILY REP.,
Mar. 23, 2010 (quoting Medical Association of Georgia president, Gary C. Richter, who said, “this
decision is a loss for patients concerned about physician availability”); Gov. Rick Perry, Tort Reform
Must Be Part of Health Care Reform, WASH. EXAMINER (Aug. 12, 2009, 11:00 PM),
http://washingtonexaminer.com/op-eds/2009/08/gov-rick-perry-tort-reform-must-be-part-health-carereform (“Sixty percent of [Texas] counties had no pediatricians, which often meant delayed, or denied
health care for sick children,” due to frivolous lawsuits and cost of medical malpractice insurance);
Roger A. Rosenblatt et al., Tort Reform and the Obstetric Access Crisis—The Case of the WAMI States,
154 W. J. MED. 693, 693 (1991) (stating changes in practice patterns due to medical malpractice
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P.C. v. Nestlehutt,5 the Georgia Supreme Court ruled the damage cap
imposed by section 51-13-1 violated the right to a jury trial found in
the Georgia constitution, which states, “The right to trial by jury shall
remain inviolate.”6
Described as the “cornerstone” of Georgia’s 2005 tort reform law7
and “the most controversial part of Senate Bill 3,”8 the provision for
caps on noneconomic damages became the focus of legal debate in
Georgia.9 The states are split on whether these caps are
unconstitutional. At least eleven states have ruled the statutes
unconstitutional for various reasons, such as violation of the right to a
jury trial or separation of powers, while over a dozen states have
upheld the caps.10 Interestingly, no federal caps have been enacted
and Congress declined to include a damage cap provision in the
recently passed Health Care Bill.11
severely affect poor women and women living in rural areas where providers have limited scope of
obstetric practice).
5. Nestlehutt, 691 S.E.2d 218.
6. GA. CONST. art. I, § I, para. XI(a); Nestlehutt, 691 S.E.2d at 221. The court determined article I,
section I, paragraph XI(a) of the Georgia constitution encompassed medical malpractice lawsuits
because prior to adoption of the constitution in 1798, the state recognized medical negligence claims
since there was a common law right to jury trial for claims involving medical malpractice that included
damages determined by the jury. Nestlehutt, 691 S.E.2d at 223. The court further stated that the right to
determine the amount of damages awarded is included in the right to a jury trial and requiring a court to
reduce those damages undermines the jury’s basic function. Id. (citing Lakin v. Senco Prods., Inc., 987
P.2d 463 (Or. 1999)).
7. Rankin, supra note 1.
8. Palmer, supra note 4.
9. Georgia High Court Says Damages Caps Violate Right to Jury Trial: Atlanta Oculoplastic
Surgery v. Nestlehutt, 17 No. 12 Westlaw J. Health L. 7 (2010) [hereinafter Westlaw J. Health L.]
(stating at least thirty other states have caps on non-economic damages with similar judicial reviews).
See generally ADVOCACY RES. CTR., AM. MED. ASS’N, CAPS ON DAMAGES (2011), available at
http://www.ama-assn.org/ama1/pub/upload/mm/378/capsdamages.pdf (giving an extensive table of all
of the states that have passed damage caps and judicially reviewed them through 2011).
10. See, e.g., Nestlehutt, 691 S.E.2d at 223 (finding cap on noneconomic damages violates the
Georgia constitutional right to trial by jury); Lebron v. Gottlieb Mem’l Hosp., 930 N.E.2d 895, 914 (Ill.
2010) (holding that a limit on noneconomic damages in medical malpractice lawsuits violates the
separation of powers clause in the Illinois constitution); Etheridge v. Med. Ctr. Hosp., 376 S.E.2d 525,
529 (Va. 1989) (finding once the jury has assessed damages, Virginia’s constitutional right to a jury trial
is satisfied and a court can then apply law to the facts); Westlaw J. Health L., supra note 9. See
generally DIV. OF HEALTH LAW, AM. MED. ASS’N, CONSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGES TO STATE CAPS ON
NON-ECONOMIC DAMAGES (2012), available at http://www.ama-assn.org/resources/doc/arc/arcconstitutional-challenges-jan-2012.pdf.
11. Westlaw J. Health L., supra note 9 (stating a tort reform provision was left out of the Health
Care Bill); Kevin Sack, Illinois Court Overturns Malpractice Statute, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 5, 2010, at A13
(stating neither the House Bill nor the Senate Health Care bill included significant changes in the
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Reaction to the Georgia Supreme Court’s ruling has been mixed.12
For example, R. Adam Malone, attorney for the plaintiff in
Nestlehutt, applauded the ruling for upholding the democratic values
of this country that allow the people to self-govern through acting as
jurors.13 Proponents of damage caps, including physicians and
insurance groups, such as the Medical Association of Georgia, report
that one thousand physicians have moved into Georgia since Senate
Bill 3 passed and that insurance costs are down by eighteen percent.14
Opponents to the bill say that caps will not lower insurance
premiums, that they fail to hold people accountable for actions, and
that they deny proper access to courts. Opponents further contend
that there are very few excessive jury verdicts.15
This Note has two primary purposes. The first is to examine the
need for tort reform legislation in the United States in order to reduce
health care costs for patients, doctors, and insurers, and to foster
competition and availability of health care providers in all areas of
the country. The second purpose is to examine actions available to
the Georgia legislature by (1) examining how noneconomic damage
medical malpractice field of legislation as it has generally been a question for the states).
12. See Palmer, supra note 4.
13. Palmer, supra note 4. Plaintiff’s lawyers in general have applauded rulings striking down caps
on noneconomic damages. For example, after Illinois struck down a similar statute, the Illinois Trial
Lawyers Associations said, “the health-care crisis can not [sic] be solved by further hurting the patients
who are victims of medical errors.” Nathan Koppel, Illinois Supreme Court Tosses Malpractice Award
Curbs,
WALL
S T.
J.
(Feb.
4,
2010,
7:13
PM),
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703357104575045624066646704.html. Additionally,
opponents to caps on noneconomic damages believe the damages do not adequately deter wrongful
conduct, that jury awards are not excessive, and that damage caps will not actually reduce medical
malpractice insurance costs. F. Patrick Hubbard, The Nature and Impact of the “Tort Reform”
Movement, 35 HOFSTRA L. REV. 437, 494–95 (2006) (discussing pros and cons of caps on noneconomic
damage).
14. Palmer, supra note 4 (citing to statistics provided by MAG Mutual Insurance Co. that state,
“medical liability insurance costs are down 18 percent” since 2005 and a study performed by the Carl
Vinson Institute of Government at the University of Georgia that states there are “about 1,000 more
physicians in Georgia since the tort reform law passed in 2005”).
15. Hannah Yi Crockett et al., Note, Torts and Civil Practice, 22 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 221, 232–33
(2005) (citing to several senators who opposed the bill during the senate floor debate). Then Senator
Kasim Reed of the 35th district said that tort reform fails to reduce insurance premiums, citing the
effects of reforms in California as an example. Id. However, in California, medical malpractice liability
insurance premiums have increased at a much lower rate than national rates. Jeffrey E. Piccola, Cap
Noneconomic Damages, Attorneys’ Fees, PHYSICIAN’S NEWS DIG., June 2003, available at
http://www.physiciansnews.com/commentary/603piccola.html.
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caps have survived in other states, (2) determining whether a
constitutional amendment is viable, and (3) offering alternative
solutions to damage caps.
Part I of this Note explores the current state of the law, the history
of tort reform in the United States, and the necessity for legislation
that protects doctors—especially obstetricians— insurers, and
patients.16 Part II examines the Georgia Supreme Court’s ruling and
its policy implications.17 Specifically, Part II will analyze (1) why
these statutes are, in fact, constitutional, (2) the problematic nature of
the Georgia Supreme Court’s decision and the ability of the
legislature to work around its holding, and (3) other possible
legislative solutions.18 In light of this reasoning, Part III proposes that
the Georgia General Assembly amend the Georgia Constitution to
specifically allow the legislature to enact laws that place limits on
non-economic damages in medical liability cases.19 Alternatively,
Part III proposes the General Assembly should attempt to pass into
law limits on joint and several liability, loser pay rules, and new
procedural rules that would make frivolous lawsuits more difficult to
bring and decrease the possibility of a windfall recovery.20 Finally,
Part III recommends that all states should rally for a federal tort
reform bill.21
I. TORT REFORM: PAST, PRESENT, AND FUTURE
A. History of Tort Reform in the United States and Georgia
Tort reform and caps on noneconomic damages have been the
subject of debate since the 1970s due to what was deemed a “medical
malpractice crisis.”22 In the 1970s, legislatures began to narrow
16. See discussion infra Part I.
17. See discussion infra Part II.
18. See discussion infra Parts II.B–D
19. See discussion infra Part III.A.
20. See discussion infra Part III.B.
21. See discussion infra Part III.C.
22. Rosenblatt et al., supra note 4, at 693 (reporting that beginning in the ‘70s and ‘80s legislative
responses included regulating the insurance and medical industries and reforming the judicial tort
system).
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statutes of limitation in an effort to make malpractice insurance more
affordable by reducing the number and size of lawsuits brought
against physicians.23 California was the first state to enact a damage
cap provision in 1975 and has since seen success in reduction of
medical liability premiums compared to the nation overall and to
those states that have not enacted damage caps.24 More recently,
states have been struggling with the constitutionality of the caps.25
Georgia’s first attempt at capping noneconomic damages came
with the Tort Reform Act of 2005, which also included an end to
joint and several liability—a procedural rule that encourages
settlement—among other procedural rules that protect medical
malpractice defendants.26 The Georgia legislature overwhelmingly
supported the passage of the act.27 The House of Representatives
made several proposals to changing the bill, one of which changed
the cap amount from $250,000 to $350,000 and attempted to allow
greater recovery for catastrophic injury, which failed by one vote.28
The Act has run into several constitutional challenges in the courts
that have severely limited its power and undermined the legislature’s
reasons for enacting the safeguards.29
23. Id. at 693. All four states the researcher investigated limited the statute of limitations for
malpractice actions in the ‘70s and ‘80s. Id. Washington limited the time period to three years for
negligence claims, Alaska limited to two years, Montana limited to three years from injury or discovery,
and Idaho limited to two years after injury or one year after discovery. Id. at 697.
24. ADVOCACY RES. CTR., supra note 9. California passed the Medical Injury Compensation Reform
Act of 1975 (MICRA), which capped noneconomic damages at $250,000. Id. California had a 167%
increase in medical liability premiums in the years from 1975–2003, while the rest of the nation saw a
505% increase, and states that enacted no caps on damages, like Pennsylvania, saw a 1,400% increase in
the same time period. Piccola, supra note 15.
25. DIV. OF HEALTH LAW, supra note 10 (outlining the cases and outcomes that have challenged the
constitutionality of the statutes that cap noneconomic damages).
26. See generally Crockett et al., supra note 15. Section 11 of the bill added the cap on noneconomic
damages to section 13 of the Georgia Code. Id. at 228. Additionally the legislature added a section that
penalizes the parties for “rejecting a reasonable offer of judgment by requiring them to pay the opposing
party’s attorney’s fees.” Id. at 226. The Act also contained a provision that limited hospital liability to
actions of their agents, and stipulated a plaintiff must prove “gross negligence” by “clear and convincing
evidence” in emergency room settings. Id. at 230, 234.
27. Crockett et al., supra note 15. The Senate passed the bill in a vote of 39 to 15. Id. at 233. The
House passed the bill in a vote of 136 to 34. Id. at 237.
28. Crockett et al., supra note 15, at 235. The house adopted the $350,000 cap amount without
objection. Id.
29. See generally Crockett et al., supra note 15. The damage caps have been ruled unconstitutional
due to violation of the right to trial by jury. Atlanta Oculoplastic Surgery, P.C. v. Nestlehutt, 691 S.E.2d
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B. The Current State of Caps on Noneconomic Medical Malpractice
Damages
As of February 2008, thirty states have passed legislation that
limits the amount of money receivable for noneconomic damages in
medical malpractice cases.30 A slight majority of states have
determined the statutes do not violate their respective constitutions.31
In states that have ruled the statutes unconstitutional, a few
legislatures have responded by passing new damage cap laws.32 For
example, in 2010, Illinois struck down a statute capping
noneconomic damages in medical malpractice, after striking down a
cap on noneconomic damages in 1997 and a similar cap on economic
and noneconomic damages in 1976.33
The damage caps differ widely among the states, as the amount
capped can range from $250,000 for noneconomic damage to $1.75
million for caps on total damages, but Georgia’s statute is fairly
218 (Ga. 2010). Additionally, there have been constitutional challenges to the offer judgment provision
of Georgia Code section 9-11-68. Merritt E. McAlister, The Swift, Silent Sword Hiding in the (Defense)
Attorney’s Arsenal: The Inefficacy of Georgia’s New Offer of Judgment Statutes as Procedural Tort
Reform, 40 GA. L. REV. 995, 1027 (2006).
30. ADVOCACY RES. CTR., supra note 9. These caps vary widely on both amount of damages
allowed and the type of damages covered. For example, some states cap all damages while other states
only cap noneconomic damages. See, e.g., id. The Georgia statute explicitly states it only covers
noneconomic damages. Id.; GA. CODE ANN. § 51-13-1 (2005), declared unconstitutional by Nestlehutt,
691 S.E.2d 218.
31. ADVOCACY RES. CTR., supra note 9. As of publication date of this article in 2008, seventeen of
the thirty states upheld the damage caps. Id. However, in some of the states where the caps were
overturned the legislatures have enacted new laws after the old caps were found unconstitutional. Id.
Some courts have continued to overturn the new legislation. Id. For example, in February 2010, Illinois
struck down a cap on noneconomic damages for the third time. Sack, supra note 11; see also DIV. OF
HEALTH LAW, supra note 10 (providing an update through October 2009, showing a majority of states
upholding the statutes).
32. See Sack, supra note 11. The Illinois Supreme Court has ruled damage cap statutes
unconstitutional three times. Id. North Dakota also enacted new caps after a previous law was struck
down. ADVOCACY RES. CTR., supra note 9 (citing Arneson v. Olson, 270 N.W.2d 125 (N.D. 1978). In
New Hampshire, a damage cap was struck down in 1980 and a second damage cap was overturned again
in 1991. ADVOCACY RES. CTR., supra note 9 (citing Brannigan v. Usitalo, 587 A.2d 1232 (N.H. 1991);
Carson v. Maurer, 424 A.2d 825 (N.H. 1980)).
33. Lebron v. Gottlieb Mem’l Hosp., 930 N.E.2d 895, 914 (Ill. 2010) (finding the caps violated the
separation of powers clause of the Illinois constitution); Best v. Taylor Mach. Works, 689 N.E.2d 1057
(Ill. 1997); ADVOCACY RES. CTR., supra note 9 (citing Wright v. Cent. DuPage Hosp. Ass’n, 347
N.E.2d 736 (Ill. 1976)). The statute overturned in 1976 was a $500,000 cap on economic and
noneconomic damages, while the statutes overturned in 1997 and 2010 were both $500,000 caps on
noneconomic damages. ADVOCACY RES. CTR., supra note 9.
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similar to other states.34 Georgia Code section 51-13-1 provided that
in medical malpractice cases the total amount of noneconomic
damages was limited to an amount under $350,000 even in cases of
wrongful death.35 The statute explicitly stated that the term
“noneconomic damages” did not include items such as past and
future medical expenses, wages, or income.36 The term
“noneconomic damages” was defined in the statute as “physical and
emotional pain, discomfort, anxiety, hardship . . . loss of enjoyment
of life . . . loss of consortium . . . and all other nonpecuniary losses of
any kind or nature.”37
Georgia Code section 51-13-1 was an important part of the Tort
Reform Act of 2005 that addressed what the General Assembly
called a medical crisis.38 Despite this legislative intent, the Georgia
Supreme Court ruled that the statute was unconstitutional in Atlanta
Oculoplastic Surgery, P.C. v. Nestlehutt.39 In Nestlehutt, the plaintiff
sued a medical facility that employed the physician who performed a
facelift that left her permanently disfigured.40 After a mistrial, the
second jury awarded the plaintiff $1,265,000, which included
medical expenses plus noneconomic damages of pain and suffering
in the amount of $900,000 and $250,000 for loss of consortium.41
Georgia Code section 51-13-1 would have reduced the award for pain

34. See GA. CODE ANN. § 51-13-1 (2005); ADVOCACY RES. CTR., supra note 9. California’s statute,
which was the first damage cap enacted in 1975 limited noneconomic to $250,000 while Nebraska sets a
cap on total damages at $1.75 million. See ADVOCACY RES. CTR., supra note 9. Unlike Georgia, some
statutes adjust for inflation and do not apply in gross malpractice claims. Id. Most states, like Georgia,
cap noneconomic damages at $250,000 to $350,000 and have fixed caps that do not have exceptions for
certain injuries. Id.
35. GA. CODE ANN. § 51-13-1 (2005), declared unconstitutional by Nestlehutt, 691 S.E.2d 218.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Crockett et al., supra note 15, at 232. Representative Tom Rice said he based his support of the
Tort Reform Act on “simple economics.” Id. at 235. He said the simple economics were due to “the
increase in insurance premiums, the number of insurance companies leaving the state, and the number of
medical specialists and facilities leaving the state.” Id.
39. Nestlehutt, 691 S.E.2d at 220.
40. Id. The plaintiff sued the medical facility, Atlanta Oculoplastic Surgery who employed Harvey
P. Cole, M.D. the surgeon that caused Ms. Nestlhutt’s disfigurement during facelift surgery in 2006. Id.
41. Id.
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and suffering and loss of consortium to the statutory limit of
$350,000.42
The trial court refused to reduce the damage amount as directed in
the statute and denied the defendant’s request for new trial.
Subsequently, the defendant appealed the ruling.43 The Georgia
Supreme Court ultimately found the statute violated the right to a
jury trial found in the Georgia Constitution and declined to consider
the alternative arguments of whether it violated the separation of
powers or the equal protection clause of its constitution.44
Georgia is far from the only state that has wrestled with this issue,
as thus far twenty-nine states have faced constitutional challenges to
caps on noneconomic damages.45 The reasoning articulated by courts
that have ruled statutes unconstitutional varies widely, giving the
Georgia Supreme Court many lines of reasoning to strike down any
new cap statutes that may come its way.46 For example, the Illinois
Supreme Court ruled such statutes unconstitutional on three separate
occasions for two reasons: in 1997, the court found the statute
violated the prohibition against special legislation, and in 2010
determined the newest cap violated the separation of powers doctrine
in the state’s constitution.47 New Hampshire also struck down
42. Id. The court was to reduce the jury’s damages by $800,000 to $350,000 according to the statute.
See GA. CODE ANN. § 51-13-1 (2005).
43. Nestlehutt, 691 S.E.2d at 220. The plaintiffs moved to have Georgia Code section 51-13-1
declared unconstitutional, which the trial court granted and allowed the full measure of damages to be
awarded. Id. at 220. The trial court found not only that the statute violated the right to trial by jury but
also violated the doctrines of separation of powers and equal protection. Id. The defendants then
appealed their denied motion for a new trial, which ultimately reached the Georgia Supreme Court. Id.
The appellants asked the Georgia Supreme Court to determine whether the statute violated the right to
jury trial and whether the statute applies retroactively. Id. at 220–26. The Court responded affirmatively
to both questions. Id.
44. Nestlehutt, 691 S.E.2d at 224. The alternative arguments are found in the Georgia constitution.
The first is the separation of powers doctrine under article I, section II, paragraph III, and the second is
the equal protection clause found in article I, section I, paragraph II. GA. CONST. art. I, § 1, para. 2; GA.
CONST. art. I, § 2, para. 3.
45. See, e.g., DIV. OF HEALTH LAW, supra note 10. The American Medical Association has listed the
states through October 2009 that have faced constitutional challenges to the non-economic damage
statutes. Id. The chart lists whether the caps were upheld or struck down, the case that brought the
question to the court, and a short description of the court’s rationale for upholding or striking down the
statute. Id.
46. See, e.g., DIV. OF HEALTH LAW, supra note 10 (outlining the rationales courts use for striking
down damage cap statutes).
47. Lebron v. Gottlieb Mem’l Hosp., 930 N.E.2d 895, 914 (Ill. 2010) (holding that a limit on
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damage cap statutes on separate occasions, finding in both 1980 and
1991 that the caps violated the state’s equal protection doctrine.48
South Dakota and Texas found the statutes violated the open courts
doctrine by creating unreasonable and arbitrary limits in litigation.49
However, a more recent Texas decision upheld a new damage cap
statute, stating it did not violate the open courts doctrine.50 In light of
the many lines of reasoning the Georgia Supreme Court can use in
the future to find caps unconstitutional, passing a constitutional
damage cap may be difficult.51 Thus, other reform measures should
be considered.52
C. The Importance of Limiting Damages in Medical Malpractice
Cases
Tort reform is an important topic in light of the large costs of
medical malpractice liability in the U.S., which Harvard University
recently determined to be $55.6 billion annually.53 The American
noneconomic damages in medical malpractice lawsuits violate the separation of powers clause in the
Illinois constitution); Best v. Taylor Mach. Works, 689 N.E.2d 1057, 1081 (Ill. 1997) (finding the cap
violated the prohibition against special legislation and separation of powers clause).
48. DIV. OF HEALTH LAW, supra note 10 (citing Brannigan v. Usitalo, 587 A.2d 1232 (N.H. 1991);
Carson v. Maurer, 425 A.2d 825 (N.H. 1980)). In Brannigan, the court reasoned the caps violated due
process because the purpose of the legislation, to bring down health care costs, did not outweigh
individual rights. Id.
49. DIV. OF HEALTH LAW, supra note 10 (citing Knowles ex rel. Knowles v. United States, 544
N.W.2d 687 (S.D. 1996); Lucas v. United States, 757 S.W.2d 687 (Tex. 1988)). In Knowles, the court
found the statute violated the open courts doctrine (that prohibits legislation that hinders access to
courts) because it limited a provider’s liability arbitrarily. Id. In Lucas the court found the limits were
unreasonable and arbitrary. Id.
50. DIV. OF HEALTH LAW, supra note 10 (citing Rose v. Doctor’s Hosp., 801 S.W.2d 841 (Tex.
1990)); Mary Alice Robbins, State Cap on Non-Economic Damages a No-Go in Eastern District of
Texas
Case,
LAW.COM
(Sept.
17,
2010),
http://texaslawyer.typepad.com/texas_lawyer_blog/2010/09/challenge-to-hb-4s-cap-on-non-economicdamages-a-no-go-in-eastern-district-of-texas-case.html. A magistrate judge for the Eastern District of
Texas found that the Tort Reform Act of 2003, which places a cap on non-economic damages, did not
violate the open courts doctrine because it did not hinder access to the courts. Robbins, supra (citing
Watson v. Hortman, No. 2:08-CV-81-TJW-CE, slip op. at 5 (E.D. Tex. Sept. 13, 2010)).
51. Andy Peters, Legislators Are Left with Few Options, FULTON CNTY. DAILY REP., Mar. 23, 2010.
At this point, the legislature’s only option is to amend the constitution to reverse the court. Id. An
amendment requires approval of two-thirds of the House and Senate. Id. However, in March 2010, the
chair of the Senate Health and Human Services Committee said they could not get the votes. Id.
52. Peters, supra note 51 (explaining that the Medical Association of Georgia said it would look into
alternative legislative options).
53. Bruce Japsen, Malpractice Costs Top $55 Billion a Year in U.S., CHI. TRIB.

Published by Reading Room, 2012

9

Georgia State University Law Review, Vol. 28, Iss. 4 [2012], Art. 12

1348

GEORGIA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 28:4

Medical Association has called for states to pass various tort reform
packages to stem the rise of liability premiums that may cause
doctors to leave certain practice areas.54 The Western Journal of
Medicine found that issues related to medical malpractice, such as
malpractice insurance, are “the most powerful factors” when
physicians consider whether to provide obstetric services.55 For
example, many general and family physicians no longer provide
obstetric care because of the high price and frequency of malpractice
lawsuits in the area.56 However, according to the American Medical
Association, “non-economic caps and direct tort reforms more
generally have a positive effect on the number of physicians per
capita in a state.”57
II. LEGISLATIVE OPTIONS FOR REDUCING THE PRICE OF MEDICAL
MALPRACTICE INSURANCE
A. How Georgia Courts Got it Wrong
Georgia is in the minority of states that have found caps on
noneconomic damages unconstitutional, and five of the eleven states
that have struck down noneconomic caps have enacted new caps that
still stand.58 Only four states besides Georgia have found that
(Sept. 8, 2010, 7:09 PM), http://chicagotribune.com/business/ct-biz-0909-notebook-health20100908,0,4495498.story (stating that Harvard University found “the annual overall cost of medical
liability to be $55.6 billion.”). The analysis included payments of damages, attorney’s fees and lost work
time for doctors. Id.
54. CAROL K. KANE & DAVID W. EMMONS, AM. MED. ASS’N, THE IMPACT OF CAPS ON DAMAGES.
HOW ARE MARKETS FOR MEDICAL LIABILITY INSURANCE AND MEDICAL SERVICES AFFECTED? (2005),
available at http://www.ama-assn.org/ama1/pub/upload/mm/363/prp200502caps.pdf.
55. Rosenblatt et al., supra note 4, at 693–98 (“During the 1980’s, thousands of providers stopped
practicing obstetrics or severely limited the scope of their practices, most frequently citing their
concerns about medical malpractice as the reason for these changes in their obstetric practices.”).
56. Id. at 698.
57. KANE & EMMONS, supra note 54, at 2. According to the association’s research, states
experienced lower growth of medical liability insurance rates when tort reform legislation was passed.
Id. Studies using the American Medical Association’s demographic information on physicians show that
states with direct tort reforms increased physician supply relative to non-reform states, especially in
high-risk specialties. Id. at 5.
58. DIV. OF HEALTH LAW, supra note 10. As of publication, eleven out of twenty-nine states with
damage caps ruled that noneconomic damage caps were unconstitutional. Id. In 1978, North Dakota
struck down a damage cap for violating the right to trial by jury but enacted a new statute in 1995. Id.
(citing Arneson v. Olson, 270 N.W.2d 125, 134–37 (N.D. 1978)). Ohio struck down a damage cap for
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noneconomic caps violated the right to trial by jury, one of which has
since enacted a new cap.59 The Georgia Supreme Court in Nestlehutt
stated in a footnote the contradictory authority was weak because the
states had “less comprehensive” jury trial provisions or employed
“unpersuasive reasoning.”60 However, the reasoning of the courts
with “less comprehensive” jury trial provisions is very similar to the
courts with an equally comprehensive jury trial provision as
Georgia.61 Utah’s constitution states the right to trial by jury is
inviolate only in capital cases.62 However, the Utah Supreme Court
still found the jury decides the facts and the court can apply law by
reducing damages.63 This is the same reasoning the Ohio court used,
a state which has a strong constitutional provision for the right to trial
by jury just like Georgia.64
Courts have reasoned caps do not impinge on the right to a jury
trial because they do not remove determination of the facts from the
jury.65 Generally, courts have determined that after a jury has reached
its verdict, the trial court may properly enter judgment consistent
with the law.66 Moreover, courts have pointed out that legislatures
violating the due process clause in State ex rel. Ohio Academy of Trial Lawyers v. Sheward, 715 N.E.2d
1062 (1999), but enacted a new law in 2002. Oklahoma struck down its damage cap in 2008 and enacted
a new law in 2009. Id. (citing Woods v. Unity Health Ctr., Inc., 196 P.3d 529, 531 (2008)). Texas struck
down a damage cap as applied to medical malpractice caps in 1988, but enacted new legislation in 2003.
Id. (citing Lucas v. United States, 757 S.W.2d 687 (Tex. 1988)). Wisconsin’s damage cap was struck
down in 2005 and new legislation was enacted a year later in 2006. Id. (citing Ferdon v. Wis. Patient
Comp. Fund, 284 Wis. 2d 573 (2005)). Thus, only six states that have struck down their damage caps
remain without damage caps today.
59. DIV. OF HEALTH LAW, supra note 10. Only four other states, Alabama, North Dakota, Oregon,
and Washington found the damage cap statutes were an unconstitutional infringement of the right to trial
by jury. Id. In 1978, a North Dakota court found a damage cap statute that included a limit on damages
to $300,000 violated the right to trial by jury. Arneson, 270 N.W.2d at 134–37. The court said that the
right to trial by jury was a basic right in the state and the statute was an unconstitutional deprivation of
that right. Id. at 137. In 1995, North Dakota enacted a $500,000 cap on noneconomic damages in
medical malpractice actions. N.D. CENT. CODE § 32-42-02 (1995). The new cap has not yet been
constitutionally challenged. See DIV. OF HEALTH LAW, supra note 10.
60. Atlanta Oculoplastic Surgery, P.C. v. Nestlehutt, 691 S.E.2d 218, 224 n.8 (Ga. 2010).
61. See, e.g., Arbino v. Johnson, 880 N.E.2d 420, 430–33 (Ohio 2007); Judd v. Drezga, 103 P.3d
135, 144–46 (Utah 2004).
62. UTAH CONST. art. I, § 10.
63. Judd, 103 P.3d at 145.
64. Arbino, 880 N.E.2d at 430–33.
65. Arbino, 880 N.E.2d at 431; Judd, 103 P.3d at 146.
66. See, e.g., Arbino, 880 N.E.2d at 432; Kirkland v. Blaine Cnty. Med. Ctr., 4 P.3d 1115, 1120
(Idaho 2000) (“The legal consequences and effect of a jury’s verdict are a matter for the legislature (by
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have set limits in other ways, such as through statutes of limitation,
so it logically follows that the legislature can also limit remedies.67
Courts have argued that remedies are a matter of law, not fact, and
because limits are assigned after a jury completes its fact-finding
function, remedies do not apply to a jury’s role.68 Further, the right to
a jury trial guarantees only rights that existed at common law and
some courts have pointed out there is no common law right to a full
recovery in tort cases.69 This logical rationale used by other courts
warrants at least more than a dismissive sentence in a footnote.
In Nestlehutt, the Georgia Supreme Court did not address the
separation of powers or equal protection arguments made by the trial
court because it already held the statute unconstitutional for violating
the right to trial by jury.70 However, it is important to realize these
constitutional provisions do not bar caps on damages in the majority
of states.71 The courts that have found a violation of the separation of
powers doctrine say the legislature encroaches on the judiciary’s
power of review by enacting caps.72 For example, in Kirkland v.
Blaine County Medical Center73 the plaintiff argued that the cap
infringes on “the inherent right of the courts to reduce jury verdicts in
those instances where the evidence demonstrates the jury’s verdict is
passing laws) and the courts (by applying those laws to the facts as found by the jury).”).
67. Phillips v. MIRAC, Inc., 651 N.W.2d 437, 442 (Mich. 2002). The court mentioned the
legislature’s limitations in rules such as governmental immunity from tort liability, workers’
compensation being the exclusive remedy against employers, or certain tort cases where the plaintiff is
at fault for her own injuries. Id.
68. E.g., Murphy v. Edmonds, 601 A.2d 102, 117–18 (Md. 1992) (finding that the statute does not
apply until the jury’s fact-finding function is completed and noting that a majority of the states that have
considered this question have found caps do not violate the right to jury trial); Etheridge v. Med. Ctr.
Hosp., 376 S.E.2d 525, 529 (Va. 1989) (holding there is no violation of the right to trial by jury when
the jury resolved the facts and assessed damages before the court applied the law to the facts).
69. See, e.g., Etheridge, 376 S.E.2d at 529 (Va. 1989). “[T]he jury resolved the disputed facts and
assessed the damages.” Id. Once this task is completed, the trial court is free to apply the law and reduce
the verdict. Id.
70. Atlanta Oculoplastic Surgery, P.C. v. Nestlehutt, 691 S.E.2d 218, 224 (Ga. 2010). The trial court
found the statute unconstitutional for violating the right to trial by jury, separation of powers, and the
right to equal protection. Id. at 220. The Georgia Supreme Court affirmed the ruling after finding the
statute violates the right to trial by jury. Id.
71. ADVOCACY RES. CTR., supra note 9.
72. Lebron v. Gottlieb Mem’l Hosp., 930 N.E.2d 895, 908 (Ill. 2010) (stating the relevant question is
whether “the statute unduly encroach[es] on the judiciary’s ‘sphere of authority’”).
73. Kirkland v. Blaine Cnty. Med. Ctr., 4 P.3d 1115, 1115 (Idaho 2000).
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excessive as a matter of law.”74 However, in Kirkland, the court
reasoned that “because it is properly within the power of the
legislature to establish statutes of limitations . . . create new causes of
action, and otherwise modify common law without violating
separation of powers,” the power to limit damages does not violate
the separation of powers.75 Another court took the analysis one step
further saying, “[W]ere a court to ignore the legislatively-determined
remedy . . . the court would invade the province of the legislature.”76
Plaintiffs have argued that caps violate equal protection because
caps do not allow similarly situated persons to be treated alike—
some plaintiffs can recover fully, while those who have noneconomic
damages totaling more than the statute cannot recover their full
amount of damages.77 Some courts have used the “rational basis” test
to determine whether there is a violation of equal protection and most
courts considering the question have found equal protection is not
violated.78 However, other courts like New Hampshire have found
damage caps unconstitutional because the purpose of the legislation
does not outweigh the rights of individuals.79
Other states have found varying reasons for striking down damage
caps that the Georgia Supreme Court did not consider.80 These
reasons include violation of a state’s prohibition against special
legislation, violation of the Due Process Clause, and violation of the

74. Id. at 1121–22.
75. Id. at 1222. The court said the legislature made a valid change in the common law of personal
injury and thus did not violate the separation of powers clause. Id.
76. Etheridge v. Med. Ctr. Hosp., 376 S.E.2d 525, 532 (Va. 1989). The court said the General
Assembly had the power to provide and modify common law remedies, and “clearly” a modification of
common law is a proper exercise of legislative power. Id.
77. See Phillips v. MIRAC, Inc., 651 N.W.2d 437, 443–44 (Mich. 2002). Only two states have
actually used this as a reason for finding caps unconstitutional, and of the two, one of the states has
enacted a new damage cap statute. DIV. OF HEALTH LAW, supra note 10 (citing Ferdon ex rel. Petrucelli
v. Wis. Patient Comp. Fund, 701 N.W.2d 440 (Wis. 2005); Brannigan v. Usitalo, 587 A.2d 1232 (N.H.
1991); Guzman v. St. Francis Hosp., 623 N.W.2d 776 (Wis. Ct. App. 2000)).
78. See DIV. OF HEALTH LAW, supra note 10; see e.g. Phillips, 651 N.W.2d at 444–45 (stating the
plaintiff here must show legislation is “arbitrary and wholly unrelated in a rational way to the objective
of the statute”). “[T]he statute is presumed constitutional, and the party challenging it bears a heavy
burden of rebutting that presumption.” Id. at 445.
79. DIV. OF HEALTH LAW, supra note 10 (citing Brannigan v. Usitalo, 587 A.2d 1232 (N.H. 1991)).
80. See generally DIV. OF HEALTH LAW, supra note 10.
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“open courts” doctrine.81 The prohibition on special legislation is a
constitutional provision that prohibits the legislature from passing
local or special laws in certain cases, such as releasing liability of a
party. Only one state has used this rationale.82 The Due Process
Clause provides no person shall “be deprived of life, liberty or
property, without due process of law,” and follows virtually the same
test to determine constitutionality as Equal Protection Clauses.83 An
example of a state constitution with an open courts provision
provides, “All courts shall be open, and every person . . . shall have a
remedy . . . .”84 An Ohio court determined damage caps do not
violate the right to open courts because they do not block a person’s
ability to pursue a claim.85
B. Amending the Georgia Constitution
A second option for the Georgia General Assembly is to amend the
state constitution. According to some Georgia lawmakers, this may
be the only option based on the court’s strong language in
Nestlehutt.86 The constitutional amendment would specifically allow
the legislature to place limits on noneconomic damages in medical
liability cases. Texas passed such an amendment to its constitution
81. Woods v. Unity Health Ctr., Inc., 196 P.3d 529, 531 (2008) (finding damage cap unconstitutional
special legislation). See generally Knowles ex rel. Knowles v. United States, 544 N.W.2d 183, 187 (S.D.
1996) (finding total damage caps violate right to due process and open courts doctrine); DIV. OF HEALTH
LAW, supra note 10.
82. Woods, 196 P.3d at 531. However, Oklahoma has since enacted a new damage cap statute. DIV.
OF HEALTH LAW, supra note 10.
83. MICH. CONST. art. I, § 17; Phillips, 651 N.W.2d at 444–45 (determining the damage cap does not
violate due process under the same rationale with which they determined the statute does not violate
equal protection).
84. OHIO CONST. art. I, § 16.
85. Arbino v. Johnson, 880 N.E.2d 420, 432–33 (Ohio 2007). The court found that the open courts
doctrine applies where an individual is “wholly foreclosed from damages after a verdict is rendered in
his or her favor,” like when collateral source benefits reduce an entire award. Id. at 433. In cases where
the plaintiff can recover some noneconomic damages, it does not violate the right to remedy or the right
to an open court. Id.
86. Peters, supra note 51. According to “three Republican state senators and two legislators in
private practice,” the best option for the General Assembly is to amend the constitution because the
court voiced strong dislike for damage caps. Id. In Nestlehutt the court said, “The very existence of the
caps, in any amount, is violative of the right to trial by jury.” Atlanta Oculoplastic Surgery, P.C. v.
Nestlehutt, 691 S.E.2d 218, 223 (Ga. 2010). Also, the fact that this was a unanimous ruling does not
bode well for any different result in the future. Peters, supra note 51.
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that was approved by voters in 2003.87 Texas’ amendment has
allowed the legislature to cap noneconomic damages at $250,000 and
pass a law that requires plaintiffs to provide expert support for a
claim within four months of filing the suit.88
According to the Texas Solicitor General, James Ho, the
amendment makes challenges such as the Nestlehutt case
impossible.89 Instead, claimants are only able to file claims in federal
court.90 Recently in Texas, plaintiffs brought a case into federal court
challenging the caps’ constitutionality and the U.S. magistrate judge
for the Eastern District of Texas upheld the caps.91 According to the
lead attorney for the defendant in the case, damage caps have always
been a state issue and “no final ruling of any federal court has found
a cap on non-economic damages unconstitutional.”92
C. Other Legislative Solutions
1. Current Legislative Solutions
The General Assembly has already taken other measures that will
aid in the reduction of damage awards and frivolous lawsuits. For
example, Georgia Code section 51-12-31 and 51-12-33 effectively
end joint and several liability, thus making it more difficult for
plaintiffs “to recover disproportionately from ‘deep pockets.’”93
87. TEX CONST. art. III, § 66; ADVOCACY RES. CTR., supra note 9. Proposition 12, an amendment to
the Texas Constitution that allows the legislature to place limits on noneconomic damages, was passed
by voters in 2003. Id. The amendment came after a Texas court found caps unconstitutional for violating
the open courts doctrine in 1988. DIV. OF HEALTH LAW, supra note 10.
88. Perry, supra note 4.
89. Robbins, supra note 50. The Solicitor General represented the defendants in a Texas case that
challenged the constitutionality of Texas’ damage cap provision in federal court. Id.
90. Id. The plaintiffs in Watson v. Hortman were forced to file their case in the Eastern District of
Texas alleging damage caps are unconstitutional for violating the right of access to the courts, the Fifth
Amendment’s Takings Clause, Equal Protection, Due Process, and the Petition Clause of the First
Amendment. Id. On September 13, 2010, the U.S. magistrate judge in the Eastern District of Texas
recommended the defendants were entitled to summary judgment because the cap is not
unconstitutional. Id.
91. Robbins, supra note 50. In the Watson case, the U.S. magistrate judge handed down the
recommendation to the U.S. district judge presiding over the case to make a final judgment. Id.
92. Id.
93. GA. CODE ANN. §§ 51-12-31, -33 (2005). The statutes provide that defendants are only
responsible for their portion of plaintiff’s injury and stipulates a jury must apportion fault between all
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Also, Georgia Code section 9-11-68 penalizes a party who refuses a
reasonable offer of judgment.94 Proponents of section 9-11-68 argue
it encourages parties to settle out of court.95 Finally, Georgia Code
section 9-11-9.1 requires an expert provide an affidavit when the
complaint is filed in malpractice cases.96 The expert requirement
ensures frivolous lawsuits will not “drag on indefinitely.”97 However,
more can be done by the legislature.
2. Possible Solutions to Consider
a. Attorney Fee Controls
First, attorney fee controls may be a viable option for the General
Assembly.98 Currently, there is no limitation on the amount of
attorney fees available in medical malpractice cases.99 Some states
limit the percentage of damage awards lawyers can receive in civil
cases.100 Alaska sets its limits through a sliding scale approach,
differentiating in the percentage of fees an attorney may collect based
on whether the damage award was non-contested, contested without a

defendants involved in the injury. Id. Rosenblatt et al., supra note 4, at 693, 695 (stating these measures
were taken by the states that have seen positive results from its tort reform legislation including
Washington, Alaska, Montana, and Idaho).
94. GA. CODE ANN. § 9-11-68(b) (2005). A defendant is entitled to attorney’s fees if the judgment
amount is less than 75% of its offer and plaintiff is entitled to fees if the judgment award is greater than
125% of its offer. Id. The Georgia Supreme Court has upheld the constitutionality of this statute. Smith
v. Baptiste, 694 S.E.2d 83, 84 (Ga. 2010) (finding the statute is not an impermissible special law, does
not violate the uniformity clause of the Georgia Constitution, and does not violate the right to the
courts).
95. Crockett et al., supra note 15, at 245. However, opponents say this measure is unnecessary since
the vast majority of lawsuits are settled outside of court anyway, and they fear this could cause “wealthy
defendants [to] bully private citizen plaintiffs into accepting ‘low ball’ offers.” Id. (citing Matthew C.
Flournoy, Georgia’s Newly Enacted 2005 Law on Offer of Judgment or Settlement (OJS) O.C.G.A. 911-68(a) to (d) (Section 5 of S.B.3), in INST. OF CONTINUING LEGAL EDUC. IN GA., GEORGIA’S NEWLY
ENACTED 2005 TORT REFORM, SENATE BILL 3, ANALYSIS AND PRACTICAL TIPS 6–7 (2005)).
96. GA. CODE ANN. § 9-11-9.1 (2005).
97. Perry, supra note 4 (stating changes like this legislation have protected both patients and doctors
from clogging up the system with baseless lawsuits).
98. Rosenblatt et al., supra note 4, at 693, 696 (finding three of the researched states have enacted
some form of attorney’s fee controls).
99. Summary of Medical Malpractice Law: Georgia, MCCULLOUGH, CAMPBELL & LANE LLP (Apr.
2, 2010), http://www.mcandl.com/georgia.html.
100. See, e.g., ALASKA R. CIV. P. 82; N.Y. JUD. LAW § 474-a (McKinney 1986).
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trial, or contested at trial.101 Reformers believe controlling fees deters
attorneys from filing frivolous lawsuits and enables the plaintiff to
keep more of the award.102
b. Allowing Evidence of Collateral Sources
The ability to reveal a plaintiff’s collateral source of compensation
would also help guard against frivolous and windfall lawsuits.103 At
common law in most states, including Georgia, the collateral source
rule hides from the jury any other benefit, such as insurance
payments, that the plaintiff has received.104 Proponents of the rule say
it is unfair to the plaintiff to reduce damages because of their
insurance benefits and that it fails to properly deter the defendant.105
Opponents of the rule suggest that it is inherently unfair that a
plaintiff recovers twice for the same injury, resulting in windfall
profits.106 Some states recognize that windfall profits for plaintiffs
mean increased medical malpractice insurance costs for physicians,
resulting in decreased access to health care for the citizens of the
state. In response, these states have enacted legislation to curb this
common law practice, such as statutes allowing evidence of a
collateral source to be brought in after the fact finder has already

101. ALASKA R. CIV. P. 82. The rule sets fees based on a sliding scale whereby it assigns a percentage
of attorney’s fees based on the amount of the award and how it was achieved. Id. For example, if a
judgment is below $25,000 and awarded at trial, an attorney receives 20% of the award, but if noncontested, an attorney receives 10% of the award. Id. Likewise, if the judgment is for over $500,000, an
attorney receives 10% of the award if litigated, but only 1% if non-contested. Id. The rule also gives
room for judicial discretion based on a number of factors including bad faith, the amount of work
performed, and the reasonableness of the claim. Id.
102. Lee Harris & Jennifer Longo, Flexible Tort Reform, 29 HAMLINE J. PUB. L. & POL’Y 61, 80–81
(2007). Opponents argue that attorneys already have an incentive not to take frivolous lawsuits through
the existence of contingency fees themselves. Id.
103. Rosenblatt et al., supra note 4, at 693, 697 (asserting three of the four states in the study enacted
collateral source rules).
104. F. Patrick Hubbard, The Nature and Impact of the “Tort Reform” Movement, 35 HOFSTRA L.
REV. 437, 485 (2006). Therefore, the court cannot reduce a damage award by the amount paid by an
outside source. Id. Georgia’s collateral source rule currently bars defendants from presenting any
evidence of third party payments in tort cases and common law has held there are no exceptions to this
rule. Olariu v. Marrero, 549 S.E.2d 121, 123 (2001) (stating, “The common law rule made no exceptions
for the introduction of evidence as to a collateral source, which rule remains applicable today.”).
105. Id.
106. Id.; Harris & Longo, supra note 102, at 76–77.
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awarded damages.107 However, statutes that abrogate or abolish the
collateral source rule have often been challenged on the same or
similar grounds as damage cap statutes.108 These challenges will be
yet another hurdle for legislators to overcome.
c. Procedural Rules
Some courts have enacted screening panels such as mandatory
mediation or arbitration.109 For example, in Florida, parties are
required to participate in mediation prior to a lawsuit.110 Proponents
of reform have even suggested a specific court for medical
malpractice suits with specially trained judges.111 Thus far,
“seventeen states require, or encourage” plaintiffs to go through a
screening panel prior to litigation.112
III. WHY THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY SHOULD FIGHT FOR REFORM AND
HOW TO PROCEED
A. The Importance of Tort Reform
The Georgia General Assembly should not give up on tort reform
through procedural reforms because it is an important step in
avoiding a health care crisis that has the potential of leaving some
Georgians, especially those in rural areas, without access to

107. ALASKA STAT. § 09.55.548 (2010); Rosenblatt et al., supra note 4, at 693, 697. Alaska’s statute
reduces a plaintiff’s award by the amount that has already been compensated. ALASKA STAT. §
09.55.548 (2010). At least sixteen state legislatures have attempted to abolish or modify the collateral
source rule. 3 JACOB A. STEIN, STEIN ON PERSONAL INJURY DAMAGES TREATISE § 19.36 (3d ed. 2011).
108. See Stein, supra note 107. For example, an Alabama statute that allows for the admissibility of
evidence of a collateral source in all actions where medical damages are claimed was challenged on
equal protection and due process grounds. Id. (citing Marsh v. Green, 782 So. 2d 223 (Ala. 2000)). The
Alabama Supreme Court ruled that the statute was valid because it did not violate the right to trial by
jury or other constitutional rights. Id.
109. Harris & Longo, supra note 102, at 72–74.
110. Id.
111. Sen. Connie Williams, Caps for Medical Malpractice Only, PHYSICIAN’S NEWS DIG., June 2003,
available at http://www.physiciansnews.com/commentary/603williams.html (describing a bill she
proposed in Pennsylvania).
112. Hubbard, supra note 104, at 521–22. Although many states had prescreening panels in the past,
the number has been reduced due to statutes being unconstitutional. Id. at 521.
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physicians.113 Proponents of reform like the Governor of Texas, Rick
Perry, have said tort reform measures like caps on damages and
various procedural measures have healed states facing a health care
crisis.114 In 2003, two-thirds of the counties in Texas had no
practicing obstetricians, 60% had no pediatricians, and twenty-four
counties had no primary care doctors.115 This shortage of medical
professionals meant long lines in doctors’ offices, causing patients to
postpone medical care and allowing minor health issues to grow into
more serious conditions.116 According to the Governor, tort reform
has turned these statistics around by reducing insurance rates by an
average of 27% and thus the number of doctors applying to practice
in the state has “skyrocketed.”117 In Texas, the number of
obstetricians in rural areas is up by 27%, and the number of
pediatricians has grown as well.118
Some have argued that even if tort reform measures are passed,
insurance companies will not necessarily reduce or maintain current
rates as a result.119 However, in Georgia, “Mag Mutual, Georgia’s
largest medical malpractice insurance provider, indicated it would . . .
honor the 10% rollback of insurance premiums upon the adoption of
the House version of SB3.”120 The quote indicates a willingness of
insurers in the state to work with physicians to make sure both parties
benefit from a reduction in medical tort damage awards.
Georgia may also lose health care providers simply because
doctors tend to migrate to states like Texas that have strong tort
reform measures and avoid states like Georgia that fail to enact
113. See generally Rosenblatt et al., supra note 4 (stating that the article’s research findings are
compatible with concluding that tort reform has decreased the rate at which physicians give up
practicing obstetrics).
114. Perry, supra note 4 (“All major liability insurers cut their rates upon passage of our reforms, with
most of those cuts ranging in the double-digits.”).
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Crockett et al., supra note 15, at 232; Harris & Longo, supra note 102, at 63. For example,
Senator Steve Thompson opposed Georgia’s damage cap provision because “he did not believe . . . a cap
would lower insurance premiums.” Crockett et al., supra note 15, at 232.
120. Crockett et al., supra note 15, at 237 (quoting Senator Preston Smith during the Senate
reconsideration of the Tort Reform Act after the House made changes).
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damage caps. A 2005 study that examined physician supply from
1985 to 2001 found an increased physician supply of 2.4% in reform
states compared to non-reform states, and in “high-risk” specialties
the increase was 11.5%.121 In order to keep current physicians in the
state and to encourage new physicians to enter the state, Georgia
should be proactive on this issue by passing procedural reforms now
and attempting to amend the constitution in the future.
B. The Inefficacy of Enacting a New Cap on Noneconomic Damages
Some states have found success in enacting new caps on damages
after their courts have found a statute unconstitutional.122 In those
states, caps have effectively controlled medical malpractice insurance
rates.123 States with caps have lower medical malpractice liability
insurance rates and have more doctors and thus better access to
physicians in rural areas and better health care overall.124 Proponents
of caps argue that damage awards are erratic and unpredictable.125
Caps not only increase predictability of awards, but also keep
damage awards at lower, more manageable levels, which will in turn
allow insurers to reduce the cost of coverage.126 In states like Texas
and California, caps have been key in bringing down the cost of
medical malpractice liability insurance.127
In light of the Georgia Supreme Court’s strong and unanimous
decision to block damage caps, the Georgia General Assembly
should not pass a new damage cap provision, even though caps have
121. KANE & EMMONS, supra note 54 (citing a Kessler, Sage, and Becker study that used the
American Medical Association’s Physician Masterfile to examine the impacts of tort reform on
physician supply).
122. See discussion supra Part II.A.
123. Piccola, supra note 15 (stating California has only seen a 167% increase in medical liability rates
while Pennsylvania, which has no such cap on noneconomic damages, has seen a rate increase of
1,400%and the national increase was 505%).
124. KANE & EMMONS, supra note 54. From 1985 to 2000, states with noneconomic damage caps had
a 2.2% increase in supply of physicians per capita compared to states without caps. Id. (citing Encinosa
and Hellinger’s 2005 paper). See also discussion supra Part III.A.
125. Richard Abel, General Damages Are Incoherent, Incalculable, Incomensurable, and
Inegalitarian (But Otherwise a Great Idea), 55 DEPAUL L. REV. 253, 291(2006).
126. See generally id.
127. See Perry, supra note 4 (stating doctor’s insurance rates have dropped on average 27%); Piccola,
supra note 15.
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been successful in other states.128 Justice Hunstein, writing for the
court, stated in no uncertain terms, “The very existence of the caps,
in any amount, is violative of the right to trial by jury.”129 Michael
Terry, an attorney for Nestlehutt, said the ruling puts the General
Assembly on notice that any new damage cap legislation will be
futile, adding, “The court was very clear saying, ‘You can’t do
this.’”130 Also, there are many rationales the court has at its disposal
to find that caps are unconstitutional even if the court later finds the
caps do not violate the right to trial by jury, making it very unlikely
the court will ever uphold such legislation.131
C. The Difficulty of Amending the Constitution
Some states have successfully amended their constitutions to
specifically allow for caps on noneconomic damages.132 However,
the likelihood of an amendment is currently slim.133 Georgia’s
constitution requires approval by two-thirds of the members of both
the House and the Senate and ratification by a majority of the voters
in the state.134 Even though the Tort Reform Act was favorably
passed in the House and the Senate, Senator Don Thomas predicted
that the GOP would not be able to obtain the two-thirds votes
necessary to approve an amendment.135 However, if the GOP can get
the votes in the future, an amendment is probably the best possible

128. See discussion supra Part II.A.
129. Atlanta Oculoplastic Surgery, P.C. v. Nestlehutt, 691 S.E.2d 218, 223 (Ga. 2010) (stating that the
fact that plaintiffs can recover fully up to the $350,000 mark does not help the statute’s constitutionality
because if the court finds the legislature can cap at that amount, the legislature will be able to cap any
amount).
130. Rankin, supra note 1.
131. See discussion supra Part II.A.
132. See discussion supra part II.B.
133. Peters, supra note 51. Senator Don Thomas, chair of the Senate Health and Human Services
Committee, said that the amendment would not receive a two-thirds vote. Id.
134. GA. CONST. art. X, § 1, para. II. Passing an amendment is much more strenuous than passing the
original Tort Reform Act which only required a majority vote in each house. Peters, supra note 51.
135. Peters, supra note 51 (stating the House may be harder to convince because of an attempted
House Tort Reform Act to raise the cap to $750,000, which did not pass and may cause some dissent
among even among Republicans who would traditionally favor this type of legislation).
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solution to enacting caps on damages that withstand constitutional
challenges.136
D. The Effectiveness and Hurdles of New Procedural Rules
Because the Georgia Supreme Court will most likely strike down a
new damage cap provision and a constitutional amendment is
probably not currently possible, the General Assembly should
consider other legislative solutions.137 The first type of reform to
consider is controlling attorney’s fees. Most countries use a “loser
pay” system where the winner is entitled to reimbursement from the
losing party.138 However, such a strict system of fee shifting may
have a “chilling effect” on plaintiffs.139 Therefore, a better solution is
limiting contingency fees to “weed out non-meritorious claims”
because lawyers will have less incentive to take frivolous cases.140
A great example of curbing attorney’s fees is New York’s sliding
scale approach to contingency fees that replaced a one-third acrossthe-board fee limit. The new approach permits an attorney to recover
30% of the first $250,000 of an award, 25% of the next $250,000,
20% of the next $500,000, 15% of the next $125,000, and only 10%
of recoveries over $1,250,000.141 The New York statute allows an
attorney to appeal for a higher percentage if compensation is
inadequate.142 Actuaries suggest that “[e]liminating the sliding fee
schedule entirely and returning to a one-third across-the-board cap

136. See discussion supra Part II.B.
137. See discussion supra Part III.B–C.
138. Marie Gryphon, Assessing the Effects of a “Loser Pays” Rule on the American Legal System:
An Economic Analysis and Proposal for Reform, 8 RUTGERS J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 567, 567–68 (2011)
(citing W. Kent Davis, The International View of Attorney Fees in Civil Suits: Why is the United States
the “Odd Man Out” in How It Pays Its Lawyers?, 16 ARIZ. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 361 (1999)) (noting
many commentators agree such a system would result in a reduction in nuisance suits).
139. McAlister, supra note 29, at 1034.
140. Medical Malpractice Reform: Limiting Contingent Fees, HEALTH CARE NEWS IN DEPTH, Apr. 5,
2010, available at www.gnyha.org/9583/File.aspx (citing ERIC NORDMAN, DAVIN CERMAK, &
KENNETH MCDANIEL, NAT’L ASS’N OF INS. COMM’RS, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE INSURANCE REPORT: A
STUDY OF MARKET CONDITIONS AND POTENTIAL SOLUTIONS TO THE RECENT CRISIS (2004), available
at http://www.naic.org/documents/topics_Med_Mal_Rpt_Final.pdf).
141. N.Y. JUD. LAW § 474-a (McKinney 1986).
142. Medical Malpractice Reform: Limiting Contingent Fees, supra note 140.
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would increase hospital costs by 25%—40% . . . .”143 Limitations like
New York’s statute decrease the number of claims and increase the
rate of settlement because attorneys and clients will have less
incentive to risk going to trial to obtain a large jury award.144 A
statute capping the amount of fees given to an attorney is likely far
less divisive than capping the amount of damages available to a
victim, making it an option the General Assembly is more likely to
agree upon in today’s political climate.
Another possible procedural rule states have used is allowing for
the admissibility of collateral source evidence after a fact finder has
rendered an award and where the court reduces the damage amount
by the amount already received.145 Many states use this approach as a
good measure to curb larger than necessary damage recoveries.146
However, it is very likely that a statute that abrogates the collateral
source rule would face many of the same challenges as damage
caps.147
A better solution is improving the dispute resolution system with
procedural reforms, because the current process is long, expensive,
and unpredictable.148 A study found plaintiffs recover, on average,
five years after the time of injury.149 Malpractice system experts
recommend creating courts dedicated specifically to evaluating
malpractice claims.150 Special courts could “meet injured patients’
needs and rights by increasing access, improving consistency in
decision-making, and enhancing equity in payments.”151 Georgia has
143. Id.
144. Id. (citing Casey L. Dwyer, An Empirical Examination of the Equal Protection Challenge to
Contingency Fee Restrictions in Medical Malpractice Reform Statutes, 56 DUKE L.J. 611 (2006)).
145. ALASKA STAT. § 09.55.548 (2010); Rosenblatt et al., supra note 4, at 697. Alaska’s statute
reduces plaintiff’s award by the amount that has already been compensated. ALASKA STAT. § 09.55.548
(2010).
146. See discussion supra Part II.C(2)(b).
147. See Stein, supra note 107.
148. Medical Malpractice Reform: Improving the Dispute Resolution System, HEALTH CARE NEWS IN
DEPTH, Feb. 8, 2010, available at www.gnyha.org/9379/File.aspx.
149. Id. (citing David Studdert et al., Claims, Errors, and Compensation Payments in Medical
Malpractice Litigation, 354 NEW ENG. J. MED. 2024, 2024–33 (2004)).
150. Id.
151. Id. (citing Michelle Mello et al., Health Courts and Accountability for Patient Safety, 84
MILBANK Q. 459, 459–92 (2006)).
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already implemented several separate special courts that have
received positive reaction.152 These courts improve fairness and
consistency in the system.153 Alternatively, the legislature should
consider mandatory arbitration to give plaintiffs an incentive to settle
before going to trial. Proponents of reform say mediation and
arbitration are preferable because they take the remedy out of the
hands of the jury, who are more prone to giving higher damage
awards due to sympathy.154
CONCLUSION
The Nestlehutt decision left the Georgia General Assembly
wondering how to implement safeguards to protect Georgia’s
physicians from high medical malpractice liability expenses that
cause a reduction in availability and an increase in the cost of health
care to citizens of the state.155 Although passing new legislation has
achieved success in some states, the Georgia Supreme Court
unanimously ruled caps unconstitutional and noted it would do so
even if the provision were altered, signaling an unwillingness to
budge on the issue.156
Constitutional amendments are effective because cases like
Nestlhutt could only be brought in federal courts that have never
found caps unconstitutional.157 However, due to the current difficulty
of amending Georgia’s constitution, the legislature should look to
other tort reform measures beyond caps on noneconomic damages.
Likewise, a collateral source rule may prove to be another
constitutional hurdle. Thus, the best solutions for the General
Assembly are creating a sliding fee system like New York’s and
152. See Megan K. Johnson, Business Court Annual Report, FULTON CNTY. SUPERIOR COURT (2011),
http://www.fultoncourt.org/sca200807/documents-and-forms/doc_view/297-business-court-reportoctober-2010.raw?tmpl=component (stating business courts were created in 2005); See Bill Rankin &
Carrie Teegardin, Drug Court: Saving Money, Saving Lives, ATLANTA J.-CONST., Mar. 4, 2012, at A1.
153. Johnson, supra note 152, at 2. Through use of judges with specialized knowledge of business
law, the business court is more time efficient and accurate. Id.
154. Harris & Longo, supra note 102, at 66–67, 72–74.
155. See discussion supra Introduction.
156. See discussion supra Part III.B.
157. See discussion supra Part II.B.
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improving the dispute resolution system through procedural reforms
such as creating courts dedicated to malpractice cases or requiring
arbitration or mediation prior to trial.158 These steps will ensure that
Georgians have access to affordable health care until further
legislative solutions can be obtained.

158. See discussion supra Part III.D.
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